Suchergebnisse

Under the EU treaties, provisions for collective (or institutional) forms of political leadership prevail over those made for leadership performed by individuals. Thus, an important leadership input from the EU's institutions, namely the European Commission, would be expectable, particularly in times of crisis. Although not having the formal power of decision, the monopoly of initiative gives the Commission a considerable ability to influence the course of EU policymaking and overall the integration process. Moreover, the Commission has learned to maximize (and to create) windows of opportunity to act by cleverly using its resources (for example, its privileged access to information and expertise). However, during the current Eurozone crisis, the role of the Commission was overshadowed by the visibility and prominence of some national leaders and other institutions. What was the role of the Commission in the economic and financial crisis? Did the Commission influence the crisis responses agreed by the Member States? This article will answer these questions by analysing the European Commission's main crisis response activities between 2008-2013. The central hypothesis of this paper is that the Commission actually played an important role in crisis response.

Trust in political institutions is vital to the normal functioning of the political system. The EU is a political system in the making, thus the levels of trust in EU institutions and in the EU as a whole could be an important indicator of the 'health' of this emerging polity. Trust is influenced by the social, economic and social environment, which means that periods of crisis could have an impact on trust. In this paper, we analyse the levels of trust during two different EU crises – the rejection of the constitutional treaty and the current Eurozone crisis. The purpose of the analysis is to establish how different types of crises, with different degrees of salience for Europeans and with different outcomes in terms of problem-solving efficiency, affect trust in the EU and confidence in its future.

<p>La UE registra actualmente uno de los niveles más bajos de apoyo popular de su historia. Un liderazgo político adecuado resulta determinante en el éxito o el fracaso de los entes políticos, especialmente en tiempos de crisis. Los períodos de crisis representan peligros, pero también una oportunidad de reformar la gobernanza y las políticas públicas europeas. La consecución de este objetivo precisará líderes capaces de equilibrar un liderazgo pragmático con un liderazgo orientador. Este artículo explora en detalle el concepto de liderazgo para, a continuación, centrarse en los desafíos que plantea la singular característica del «liderazgo compartido» en la UE. A modo de conclusión, se apunta la importancia, para resolver la crisis actual y garantizar el futuro del proyecto europeo, de contar con unos líderes «adecuados» dispuestos a ejercer auténtico liderazgo político en tiempo útil.</p><p><strong>Recibido</strong>: 09.05.2012<br /><strong>Aceptado</strong>: 05.06.2012</p>

"This book assesses the implications of the Covid-19 pandemic for the European Union, as well as its response in dealing with an overarching, multidimensional crisis with consequences extending beyond public health safety to political, economic, legal, and institutional arenas. It argues the pandemic represents a symmetric crisis cutting across countries with different social, economic and political characteristics and which yet - despite favouring cooperative solutions at the supranational level - has largely been met with initial responses of a national, even local, nature. So, how well did the EU perform as a crisis manager in the pandemic crisis? This book will be of key interest to scholars, students and readers of crisis, pandemic and health management, European Union politics and governance"--

Cover -- Half Title -- Series Information -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Table of Contents -- Illustrations -- Acknowledgements -- Abbreviations -- Introduction: COVID-19 and the European Union - Is this Time Really for Bad? -- I.1 Introduction -- I.2 Rationale of the Book -- I.3 Structure of the Book -- Notes -- Bibliography -- 1 A Crisis Beyond the Crisis -- 1.1 Introduction -- 1.2 Crisis and Reform: Paths of Continuity and Discontinuity -- 1.3 What Does this Crisis Have in Common With Previous Ones? A Comparison With the Eurozone and the Migration Crises -- 1.4 What Sets the Pandemic Apart? Symmetry and Cooperation -- Notes -- Bibliography -- 2 Political and Institutional Analysis of the Crisis -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 From a Far-Off Health Problem to a Crisis Within Europe -- 2.3 Early National Cacophony: the Politics of 'Everyman for Himself' -- 2.4 The Central Stage for EU Institutions: From National Unilateralism to European Response -- 2.5 Assessing Change: the Proposals to Enhance EU Preparedness and Response Capacity -- Conclusions -- Notes -- Bibliography -- 3 An Economic Analysis of the Pandemic Crisis -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 The Impact On GDP, Inflation and Unemployment -- 3.3 The Impact On Public Finances -- 3.4 The Economic Policy Reaction of the European Union -- 3.5 The Political Economy of the Pandemic Crisis: Is There a Place for a Normative Assessment? -- 3.6 Conclusions -- Notes -- Bibliography -- 4 Security or securitisation: Border controls as a setback for European integration? -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 Freedom of Movement as a Cornerstone of European Citizens' Way of Life -- 4.3 Dilemmas of COVID-19 Securitisation -- 4.4 Reopen Europe: De-Securitisation in Place? -- 4.5 Lessons From the COVID-19 Pandemic: the 'Pandemicisation' of Border Controls and the Idea of Security Over Freedom? -- 4.6 Conclusions -- Notes.

AbstractAs EU security is an intergovernmental policy area, it has been assumed that the only relevant policy‐shapers are member states. However, more recent analyses show that supranational actors, like the Commission, have developed strategies to enhance their role in this traditionally interstate realm. This article endorses this reasoning and intends to cast some light on these strategies. Building on Kingdon's concept of the policy entrepreneur and using EU's cybersecurity policy as an empirical case, we analyse the Commission's initiatives to draft a European response to cybercrime, in order to answer one central research question: how has the Commission managed to secure a prominent role in a highly salient security issue? The findings suggest that the Commission, acting as a policy entrepreneur, purposefully explored a market–security nexus in order to influence an otherwise intergovernmental security domain. Ultimately, the Commission was a much more relevant player than expected.